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POLITICAL SCIENCE 
United Nations Techniques in the Middle East 
W. HARTLEY CLARK* 
EDITOR'S Norn: This paper was prepared Jess than a year 
after the 1967 Arab-Israel war and more than two years be-
fore the UN again became active in the Middle East with the 
cease-fire proposal of 1970. 
The first international peace force in history was 
created by the United Nations (UN) at the time of the 
Suez crisis. At the outset, it was the subject of scorn by 
academicians. Julius Stone wrote in his book, Aggression 
and World Order, that he could not see any role for inter-
national forces short of combat service. Possibly, too, 
politicians were secretly scornful of the potentialities of 
the UN emergency force, seeing it as a mock police or-
ganization created to replace the so-called Anglo-French 
"police force" that had seized the Northern half of the 
Suez Canal. It was thought that after a display of sym-
bolic utility, the UN force could evaporate as quickly as 
it had materialized. 
The history of the UN force nevertheless seemed to have 
changed world thinking about international peace-
keeping, and the author of the plan, Canada's Lester 
Pearson, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his 
efforts. In time, the peace force idea was applied again 
by the UN in the Congo, Indonesia, and Cyprus, engen-
dering confidence in UN peace forces based on what was 
considered successful completion of t11e missions . This 
confidence is based on little else, however. There is a 
mythology of peacekeeping that envisages a courageous 
UN soldier rushing out between enemy lines, waving the 
UN flag and shouting to the combatants to stop fighting. 
Alas, the possibility for this kind of action is almost nil. 
UN soldiers would, in most cases, be prevented by one 
side or another from entering a combat zone. 
To understand international policing, it is necessary 
to survey the actual events in which it operated, and it 
is particularly revealing to see the technique unfold in 
the context of the environment in which it was first prag-
matically evolved: that is to say, in Palestine. 
International peacekeeping techniques had practically 
no antecedent when in 1948, after the British withdrew 
from Palestine, the UN created its first peace agency for 
the area, the Truce Commission. Working under a direc-
tive from the Security Council, members of the com-
mission had tried to go between the warring Arabs and 
Jews to promote a truce. News dispatches reported that 
one member lost two cars in that too dangerous game, 
and Thomas Wasson, an American, was shot to death by 
a sniper while returning home from a meeting of the 
Commission. He was the first to lose his life in UN ser-
vice-but the effort for a truce was fruitless. 
The Security Council obtained a one-month truce in 
May, 1948; and one foundation of that truce, as reported 
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by Count Folke Bernadotte and by the Security Council, 
was Arab acceptance of a freeze on Israel's importation 
of men and arms as a condition for stopping the Arab 
attack. This freeze was monitored by a neutral UN mili-
tary group numbering about 1,000 (counting the crews 
of patrol ships and planes). Allegations of Israeli in-
fringement, especially false allegations, could be pre-
vented from spiraling into new fighting by this monitor-
ing, but the system could have broken down had some 
party methodically ignored the freeze on men and ma-
terial. At least the UN was preventing a breakdown over 
imagined or distorted violations. 
The second Palestine truce ordered by the Security 
Council in July, 1948, was different. A strongly-worded 
resolution, it was to be permanent, amounting to an end 
to the war. Both sides now moved to consolidate their 
positions, making it difficult for the UN peacekeeping per-
sonnel to make any contribution. UN personnel could 
only protest as thousands of Arabs were forced to leave 
their villages in Israeli-controlled territory and seek re-
fuge in Transjordan. They could only protest as Arab 
gunners made the Jerusalem road so dangerous for Israeli 
supply convoys that it had to be abandoned and replaced 
by a road exclusively within Israeli-controlled territory. 
What brought international diplomatic pressure for an 
armistice at the end of 1948 was the major fighting in 
the Negev. With the futility characteristic of the second 
truce, the UN personnel could not get the Egyptians to 
allow lsraeli supply convoys bound for Jewish settk -
ments in the Negev to go across the Egyptian lines, as 
required by the terms of truce. So the Israelis opened their 
own way by means of an attack that pushed Egyptian 
forces back into Sinai. 
UN personnel did have some value in this end game, 
and Israeli-Lebanese fighting in Western Galilee at about 
the same time is a classic case. Each side blamed the 
other for starting the fight, and each side said it wanted 
to stop fighting but refused to do so unless the other side 
did. Only the UN, with personnel on both sides of the 
front, could talk with both and arrive at cease-fire terms 
acceptable to them. 
Armistice agreements were signed in 1949, and a new 
day of effective operation had dawned for the UN peace-
keeping personnel. But by 1951, a long-term problem 
had emerged. Was the armistice agreement permanent? 
The Israelis said no; it was just a transitional arrangement 
looking toward a final peace treaty. The Arab govern-
ments rejected this thesis and insisted year after year on 
their rights under the armistice agreements. At first the 
UN peacekeeping personnel coped with the issue by urg-
ing the Israelis to prolong their observance of the armis-
tice. For example, when in 1951, the Israeli moved Arab 
farmers from a strip of land over which they (the 
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Israelis) thought they had acquired full sovereignty, UN 
officers supervised the return of the Arabs to their land. 
In effect, the personnel had been instrumental in denatur-
ing this feud over land as noted by Jacob Hurewitz 
(1951), 
Beginning in 1953 the Israeli's embarked on a policy 
of raiding Arab nations, partly to even the score for acts 
of violence and larceny in Israel by Arab infiltrators and 
partly to prod the Arab governments into negotiating a 
final settlement, according to Walter Eytan's account 
(19 5 8) . The presence of UN officers set this policy off 
its timetable, because a UN investigation of the first seri-
ous raid established that it had been perpetrated by 
Israeli government forces, not by vengeful Israeli civil-
ians, and the atrocities had been committed. World 
opinion was shocked, and the Security Council censured 
Israel. Moderates were then elevated to top positions of 
power in Israel; but, since Arab infiltration continued, 
the policy of raiding was resumed by Israel in 1955. After 
this, the UN Chief of Staff, E.L.M. Burns, wrote: "I had 
the feeling I was trying to stop a runaway truck on a 
steep hill by throwing stones under its wheels." The 
Egyptian f edayeen raids and the large scale introduction 
of Soviet arms into Egypt added fuel to the fire, and the 
Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 was the result. 
Even before that outbreak, several political leaders 
like Adlai Stevenson and Eleanor Roosevelt had proposed 
that one cause of Middle Eastern tension be removed by 
erecting a barrier to infiltration across the borders of 
Israel. That seemed to be the best measure available, 
once the war had occurred, and minds were turned to 
the problem of preventing any repetition. The presence 
of the Anglo-French "police force" that had come to the 
Suez Canal area purportedly to protect it from the Israelis 
provided an ideal excuse for a UN force to take its place. 
In basic concept the United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF) was an intelligent barrier. At first it was a bar-
rier between Egyptian and withdrawing Anglo-French 
forces capable of keeping the sides from shooting at one 
another. It also was able to clear allied mines from the path 
of the oncoming Egyptian army. Then UNEF became a 
barrier between the Egyptian army and the allied forces 
embarking at Port Said, intelligent enough to direct traffic, 
keep civil peace and protect public utilities . Still later it 
was a barrier between Egyptian forces and Israeli forces 
withdrawing across the Sinai desert. 
Ultimately UNEF became a barrier against infiltration 
between Egypt and Israel along their common frontier, a 
job earlier UN peacekeeping units had been incapable of 
doing. Like the older UN units, UNEF worked to denature 
small incidents, but to UNEF this counter-aggravation 
work was an everyday, round-the-clock activity in which 
the force had to succeed several times every day in sepa-
rate incidents or not succeed at all. Along most of the 
Israeli-Egyptian frontier, the old Palestine-Egypt border, 
there was little chance of friction. The once-a-day jeep 
patrol along this line was a task requiring more fortitude 
than attentiveness. Throughout UNEF's decade the 
Yugoslavian battalion insisted on keeping this oneorus 
sector of the line as an on-going proof of their indefatiga-
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bility. A good share of their reports of violations 
were crossings at one point on the line where Israeli mili-
tary personnel and tourists stepped across to get an ex-
ceptionally good view of the Gulf of Aqaba, not visible 
from the Israeli side. UNEF occassionally stepped in to 
warn the Israelis they were violating the line, doing this 
once j,ust moments before an Egyptian patrol appeared 
and prepared for a fight, according to the UNEF daily 
log. 
The serious threat of infiltration was not here but along 
the Gaza Strip . In December, 1948, the Israelis had been 
unable to take the city of Gaza, thus leaving in Arab 
hands a fertile strip on the Palestine coast adjacent to 
Egypt. Into that small area about half a million human 
beings were to be concentrated for two decades, most of 
them as refugees from elsewhere. In the action and retali-
ation that triggered the 1956 war, the population pressure 
in Gaza was an important part of the overall tension. The 
Arab settlements were ideal targets for raids and artillery 
bombardments, and the teeming Arab population took 
vengeance into their own hands. Israel claimed that it 
was Arab infiltration that provoked its raids on the Gaza 
Strip. The UN saw that if infiltration could be stopped, 
a pretext for the resumption of serious action could be 
eliminated. 
A desire for peace on both sides was fundamental to 
the success on UNEF. The Israelis at first were reported 
to have patrolled too close to the line and, on occassion, 
to have crossed into the Gaza Strip. But in time they 
came to trust the capability of UNEF to patrol the line. 
The UN Secretary-General pointed out that at no time 
did the Israelis give UNEF active cooperation or let them 
onto Israeli soil, but they did pull Israeli forces away from 
the line to give UNEF a freer hand . The Arab side was 
usually cooperative throughout UNEF's history, a fact 
that Israeli propagandists portrayed as Egypt hiding be-
hind the UN's skirts . UNEF activity was confined to a 
carefully marked zone of 500 meters adjacent to the 
frontier in which arms were forbidden, and the growing 
array of Arab military installations had to stay back of 
that line. It was a difficult line; and any unauthorized 
person who crossed the UNEF zone into the zone pa-
trolled by the local military organization was certain of 
instant apprehension in daylight and stood a good chance 
of being greeted by bullets, not handcuffs. Moreover, the 
Arab soldiers frequently violated the UNEF zone, some-
times in pursuit of an infiltrator they thought UNEF 
had not seen and sometimes just to irritate UNEF. 
The fifty meters closest to Israel were UNEF's own. 
UNEF issued passes to Arabs who had to work agricul-
tural land in that belt, but it apprehended an others found 
there. Persons who wandered in from Arab side were 
told to go back, but Arabs attempting to cross the Israeli 
line or who crossed it and returned to the UNEF zone 
were apprehended by UNEF. These and any Israelis who 
crossed the line had to be handed over to the Egyptian 
authorities for trial and punishment. 
There were three ways UNEF could be outmaneu-
vered. First, surveillance at night was poor. The Swedish 
UN troops had success with dogs at night, but they 
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caused an unfavorable public reaction. Second, Arab in-
filtrators going into Israel could be stopped only in the 
UNEF zone and could not be pursued into Israel by the 
UNEF. Third, UNEF observer posts and patrols were 
thinly manned, so any group that outnumbered them 
was bound to get some or all of its members through the 
UN zone and across the line. The only way UN reinforce-
ments could be brought up was by means of notification 
of a standby patrol, and that took time. If an infiltrator 
struggled out of the grasp of a UNEF officer, he could 
not be gunned down as he fled. UNEF weapons could be 
used only in self-defense, and holding an infiltrator did 
not count as self-defense. But UNEF personnel were 
conspicuously armed with ready sten guns, and the fact 
that they had cut down a number of would-be assailants 
with their guns in the early days of the force created a 
healthy respect for UNEF, we were told by E.L.M. 
Burns. 
The classic situation UNEF was working to avoid was 
the crossing of the line by an amateur infiltrator, in-
nocently or maliciously, and his getting hurt or hurting 
someone on the other side, thus setting off a chain reac-
tion of revenge that could escalate into a new war. As 
UNEF's number dwindled from its maximum of 6,000 
men in 1956 to a little more than ,half that number in 
1967, its members had to be worked overly hard to keep 
the line under continuous surveillance. 
Just before the Middle Eastern war of 1967 broke out, 
the frontier was the quietest it had ever been. Yet during 
the two months immediately preceding the outbreak, 
there were still only four days during which no in-
cidents had been handled by UNEF. 
In late 1966 and early 1967 there were reports of 
crossings into Gaza by Israeli youths fleeing Israeli un-
employment or the draft, and who refused to be repatri-
ated to Israel. Normally, UNEF apprehended them as 
they came across and handed them over to the Egyptian 
liaison officer. In one case reported by the UN, an 18-
year-old from Israel penetrated 470 meters of the 500 
meter UNEF patrol zone. Within a few steps he would 
have been at the mercy of the Palestine Liberation Army 
of Arab guerrillas, but UNEF caught him. 
Another type of problem was caused by large groups 
of Arabs who crossed the line to reap Israeli crops and 
expected afterwards to return to thetr own side. They 
feared that tangling with UNEF would mean a jail sen-
tence, so they would make a run for it back into Gaza 
when UNEF patrols appeared. What was UNEF to do? 
It might cause the jailing of thirty breadwinners at a 
time. Or, worse yet, the Arabs might decide to stay on 
the Israeli side and get into trouble there. UNEF seemed 
to handle this problem by frightening the groups back 
into Gaza and seizing one or two persons as examples. 
Single Arab infiltrators were caught regu,larly by UNEF, 
but sometimes it was on their homebound crossing after 
having done their damage. 
UNEF's most sensitive problem was to prevent direct 
conflict between Israeli and Arab forces, and tense situa-
tions presented themselves from time to time. Split-
second timing by UNEF was vital for a peaceful result. 
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In May, 1965, for instance, an Israeli patrol took up a 
position on their side of the line and a Palestine Libera-
tion Army patrol appeared on the other side, inside the 
UNEF zone. UNEF immediately interposed, facing down 
the barrels of the Arab guns and backing the patrol out 
of the zone. In October of that year, when twenty-five 
Israelis had penetrated two kilometers into Egypt, Egypti-
an forces to the rear of UNEF opened up on them from 
long range. When the Israelis responded to a UNEF order 
to turn around, they were still fired upon as they re-
treated. Had UNEF not been there, the shooting might 
have been more serious. When Arab military personnel 
reckoned that UNEF had failed to spot an Israeli infil-
trator, they moved into the UNEF zone illegally them-
selves. Often it became a race to see if UNEF could in-
terpose itself between the two hostile parties before they 
met within the UNEF zone. 
In order to forestall confrontations, UNEF would do 
almost anything. Once when an Israeli patrol vehicle got 
stuck in the sand on its own patrol road, UNEF crossed 
the line to help push it out so as to avoid tempting Arabs 
to shoot at the apparently helpless vehicle. Normally, 
UNEF maintained rigid discipline in refusing to have 
relations of any sort with Israelis. 
AJ,though it teetered on the edge of breakdown every 
day for a decade, the peace along the armistice line was, 
in fact, maintained by the overworked and often abused 
UNEF. The war of 1967 was in no way related to condi-
tions along this line. UNEF had done its job. Its capa-
bility for interposition between enemy units and for 
discouraging and apprehending infiltrators was reliable. 
At the time it was relieved of its function by the 
Egyptian government in May, 1967, there was no pos-
sibility that UNEF might protest and stand fast, expect-
ing to interpose between enemy units that had been or-
dered into battle. UNEF was set up to pacify a difficult 
frontier between nations practically at peace, and all of 
its techniques and its abilities relied on this peaceful 
framework. Once war was invoked, their role vanished; 
and their withdrawal became simply a question of pro-
tecting the lives of the members of UNEF. Unfortunate-
ly, when the time for withdrawal came, the improvisations 
of the moment did not succeed in saving the lives of all 
of UNEF, most of whom were still in Gaza when the 
June war swept over them. 
By the time UNEF was terminated, the UN had in-
vented and practiced in the Middle East all of its various 
peacekeeping techniques, with the main exception of the 
combat techniques applied in the Congo. In general, these 
techniques resulted in the delay of hostilities. Without UN 
supervision of Israeli reinforcements during the first truce 
in 1948, the truce might have broken down almost im-
mediately. The kind of international action triggered by 
UN observer reports on truce violations had an impor-
tant dampening effect on the raiding and recrudescence 
of violence in the Middle East after 1949. The character 
of these raids might otherwise have been so obfuscated 
by propaganda that the Great Powers might not have felt 
able to take a stand. And the Arab-Israeli war of 1956 
might have occurred, say, two years earlier. The war of 
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1967 grew out of what were at first minor clashes along 
the Israeli-Syrian border. It was UNEF that prevented 
such clashes from occurring on the Israeli-Egyptian line, 
and had there been a similar force on the Syrian border, 
the 1967 war might have been delayed. And the delaying 
and averting of hostHities are more similar in practice 
than they are in concept, because for some unforeseen 
reason a delayed war may never occur. 
There is no grand or obvious rationale for the 1967 
war. In it the Arabs lost assets while the Israelis gained 
liabilities: the Arabs lost land it would be hard for Israel 
to hold. Neither side found itself is an improved military 
position regarding the other. If, in fact, some minor truce 
violation or some equally irrational source of the carnage 
could be identified, the 1967 war would serve to under-
score the value of the diligent efforts of the UN to sup-
press minor causes. The war does not show the UN efforts 
to have been useless-only inadequate. 
Though small in number and power, the UN personnel 
had a bearing on the peace because of the special situa-
tions in which they found themselves: being able to watch 
contraband, to communicate with both sides to get cease-
fire agreements, to fix blame impartially and to catch in-
filtrators . Looked at in isolation, these services are not 
impressive; but, looked at in the context of what was 
needed, the peace would have been as surely lost without 
them as the poetic kingdom would have been lost for 
want of a horseshoe nail. But will UN policing ever again 
reach the proportions of UNEF? Until the Israelis with-
draw from their newly won Arab lands, the front between 
the two sides will be too volatile to permit UN policing. 
But after a relaxation of tension in the area, there may be 
police work for the UN. 
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Notes 
1. New York Times, May 22 and 23, 1948. 
2. Count Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem (London: Hod-
der and Sloughton, 1951); and UN, Security Council, Official 
Records, Supplement for June 1948, pp. 79-81. 
3. UN, Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for 
November 1948. 
4. Incidents confronting UNEF are described on the basis 
of the "Daily Log," the daily operations reports of UNEF. 
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